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Abstract
Organizations experience frequent cyber-attacks, and recovery comes at a high cost. Of
especially high concern are those breaches involving inter-organizational networks, since
repercussions can quickly spread across organizations. We report on a case study of such a
security incident. Inter-organizational cooperation was required to detect the scope of the
breach and to recover from its effects. Drawing on the resource based view (RBV), we
propose that effective response to security incidents relies on bundles of complementary
resources (assets and capabilities) available to the cooperating parties. We identify
institutional, technical, and organizational resources used during incident response, and
analyze to what extent each was complementary to or non-compatible with other resources.
Our findings suggest that resources can be complementary in some situations and not
complementary in other situations. We identify specific forms of non-compatibility, and offer
suggestions for further research which would aim to help organizations assemble resource
bundles to effectively respond to network breaches that can impact inter-organizational
relationships.
Keywords: Resource Based View, Complementary Resources, Interorganizational
Collaboration, Network Security, Incident Response

1 Introduction
In 2011, large organizations reportedly spent on average 6.5 million Euro recovering from
security breaches, and took 18 days to recover from such incidents (Ponemon Institute, 2011).
Valid username and password combinations (―credentials‖) provide access to an
organization’s intellectual property, and are thus highly valued in black-market exchanges.
One study reported that individuals are likely to use the same username and password
combination on fifty-four per cent of sites they visit (Bang, et al., 2012). Knowing this,
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malicious parties harvest as many credentials as possible. Attacks using stolen credentials are
difficult to detect because their usage behavior appears legitimate.
Prior IS security studies addressed questions such as: Why do some individuals use more
secure passwords, while others do not (Duggan, et al., 2012)? How strong are user passwords
and how often are they forgotten (Florencio & Herley, 2007)? or How can organizations
apply social pressure and penalties in order to enhance end users’ security awareness (Boss, et
al., 2009) (Herath & Rao, 2009) (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010)? Other studies examined how
organizations protect themselves (Hu, et al., 2007) (Temizkan, et al., 2012), end-users’
motivations and security-related behavior (Liang & Xue, 2010) (Guo, et al., 2011), and the
motivations of malicious agents (Mookerjee, et al., 2011) (Galbreth & Shor, 2010). Thus far,
few studies have examined IS security issues at an inter-organizational level, yet during
network security incidents, an organization, seeking to identify what has occurred and how to
recover from attacks may need to cooperate (Liu, et al., 2011) or share information with other
firms (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005).
We conducted a case study to investigate whether, to what extent, and how bundles of
complementary institutional, technical, and organizational resources facilitated interorganizational cooperation in response to security breaches. A similar classification scheme
has been applied in other studies of interorganizational collaboration (Fedorowicz et al.,
2006; Gogan & McLaughlin, 2013).
Our study examined how two organizations –members of the Nordic DataGrid Facility
(NDGF) – collaborated to investigate and remediate a security breach that occurred at the
University of Oslo (Universitetet i Oslo, UiO). We analyzed this security incident by
examining how bundles of complementary and non-compatible resources facilitated or
impeded members’ responses to the breach.
In the next section, we discuss relevant studies in three research streams: IS security, the
resource based view of strategic management and industrial organizations, and IS studies that
drew on RBV. We focus on prior research that examined how bundles of complementary
resources support operational and strategic effectiveness.

2 Complementary Resources in IT Security Programs
The strategic management of resources is a core topic in management research. Early studies
of the resource based view of the firm (RBV) examined how resources contribute to
competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984) (Barney, 1991). Subsequent studies examined how
resource bundles and/or dynamically reconfigured capabilities support competitive advantage
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Studies in the last five years have applied RBV to such varied
topics as strategy in small to medium size enterprises (SMEs), how firms use shared resources
to compete effectively in global markets (Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008), management of
human capital (Ployhart, Van Iddekinge, & Mackenzie, 2011), and how knowledge resources
are managed in technology-enabled social networks (von Krogh, 2012).
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A complementary relationship may be thought of as ―the whole is more than the sum of its
parts‖ (Aristotle, cira 350 BC). According to economists, resources are complements when a
firm’s profit function satisfies increasing differences from combining multiple resources
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). To be considered complementary, resources must also satisfy the
restriction of ―supermodularity‖ or they demonstrate increasing differences in the output of
the resource configuration when either resource is increased (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995).
Thus, economic studies of supermodularity provide a mathematical construct which enhances
the understanding of how managed resource bundles affect firm outputs—an increase in either
resource will yield increasing realized values of the bundled set of resources.
Studies by Milgrom (1995), Bresnahan (2002), Brynjolfsson (2002), Hitt (2007), and McAfee
(2008) examined the management and use of complementary resources. Nevo and Wade
(2010) and (2011), extended this research by drawing on systems theory (Corning, 1998).
Nevo and Wade identified necessary preconditions through which the advantages of
complementarity can be realized. They assert that a firm will not realize increasing gains of
two resources if those resources are not compatible, and they add a further restriction: gains
from complementarity must offset the additional costs of resource integration.
Studies of managerial aspects of IT/IS security programs have focused on several aspects,
including the technical performance of various security technologies (Cavusoglu, Mishra, &
Raghunathan, 2004), deterrents of security incidents that result from IT misuse (D'Arcy, et al.,
2009), effectiveness of various preventive measures (Yue & Cakanyildirim, 2007) and
maintenance efforts required to sustain preventive measures (Mookerjee et al., 2011).
Numerous practitioners remind us that investments in up-to-date resources such as intrusion
protection systems (IPS), vulnerability scanners, and highly trained security engineers will not
prevent all security incidents from occurring. Many IS managers do not feel that their security
challenges are due to insufficient investment in security equipment, policies, or people; rather,
it is the complexity of their environments which hinders their efforts to prevent security
incidents and respond to them (Richardson, 2011). To date, there has not been extensive
research on how firms actually respond to security incidents—perhaps because many
organizations are reluctant to not publically report such incidents.
The resource based view has proved to be a useful lens to study strategic and operational
management, and it should prove similarly useful in shedding light on the effective
configuration of assets and capabilities for IT and IS security programs. Thus far, however,
RBV has not been extensively applied to IS security research. Our research seeks to fill that
gap by investigating how bundles of complementary and non-compatible resources affect
organizations’ ability to respond, singularly or collectively, to security incidents.

3 Research Methodology: Case Study
The Computing Emergency Response Team (CERT) at the University of Oslo (Universitetet I
Oslo, UiO), is responsible for detecting, responding to, and remediating security incidents that
affect the university. At 18:34, on 9 August 2011, one of UiO’s high performance
computational grids was taken off-line because it was discovered that it was compromised by
a malicious agent. Data about this incident and the resources involved in detection and
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remediation were gathered from public and private sources (presentations, web site, etc.) and
interviews conducted with four individuals:





manager of the UiO Computer Emergency Response Team in Oslo, Norway
security officer at National Supercomputer Centre at Linköping University in Sweden
technical leader in Cisco’s Threat Research in Austin, Texas, USA
engineer in Cisco’s Security Research and Operations team in Austin, Texas, USA

Interviews were conducted via WebEx sessions, e-mail, and instant messenger conversations.
Analysis proceeded with the authors independently assigning codes using a high-level coding
scheme. Specifically, each author sought evidence for the existence of, and impact of several
categories of resources:







institutional assets (e.g., funding agencies, laws or regulations)
institutional capabilities (e.g., professionally sanctioned methodologies)
IT assets (e.g., hardware, software, data, network)
IT capabilities (e.g., change management, programming language facility)
organizational assets (e.g., reputation, cash resources)
organizational capabilities (e.g., training, governance, collaboration track record)

The authors jointly reviewed the interview data to reach consensus on these and other codes.
A grounded interpretive lens was then used to consider whether each resource acted as a
complement, substitute, or was non-complementary with other resources in the bundle as it
related to the investigation and remediation of the security incident.

4 Findings
4.1 A Security Incident: Password Harvesting at UiO
Almost a year before the attacks were discovered, on 18 October 2010, a security researcher
released information on a vulnerability in the C software compiler included in most Linux
operating systems. This vulnerability could be used by an authenticated user to escalate their
privileges to that of system administrator1. The security advisory included proof-of-concept
code that could be used in an attack. On 21 October 2010, Cisco released an IntelliShield
alert2 which explained the vulnerability and indicated it was unlikely to be used in an attack.
However, in November 2010, UiO’s operations team received notification that the
vulnerability had been exploited to compromise computational grids at other facilities.
In the middle of the night, 23 June 2011, an attacker used a researcher’s credentials (obtained
from another university) and used the vulnerability described in the October 2010 security

1 For details of this vulnerability see http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Oct/257
2 The alert is available at http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=21646
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advisory to gain administrative access to one of UiO’s login node on their computational grid.
Once they obtained access to this node, the attacker compiled a modified version of the SSH3
application to record other usernames and passwords combinations and store the SSH keys4
used to access the system. The attacker was also clever enough to compile a backdoor 5 into
the SSH application, ensuring they could retain access even if all user passwords were reset.
On 24 June, the attacker compromised a second login node and the SSH program on that node
was also recompiled to steal more usernames and passwords. On 15 July, the grid’s master
node was compromised. The attackers actions remained unnoticed until 9 August 2011, when
the UiO Operations team notified the university CERT team of abnormal behavior they
observed in the SSH application. The grid was immediately taken off-line, and investigation
into the incident began. At 17:45, UniNETT (the network that connects most Norwegian
universities) was notified of the outage. At 18:34 all the grid partners received electronic
notifications of the outage. Normal operations were resumed on 12 August 2011 and the
investigation concluded shortly after.
Between August 9 and 12 2011, staff at UiO and National Supercomputer Centre exchanged
emails, describing their interpretations of data contained in netflow6 and local system logs.
The UiO CERT team had followed best practices in incident response and recovery. In order
to maintain a record of the account, they created disk images before reinstalling the
compromised nodes. The team also performed security scans and penetration tests against the
new images in order to verify there were no known vulnerabilities on them.
Staff members at UiO and Linköping University worked together to reconstruct the attack
vector. They discovered that on 23 June, the UiO grid was accessed by five users, all
participants in an astrophysics research collaboration involving four Norwegian universities
and a non-Norwegian university. The CERT team quickly contacted users from the
Norwegian universities and ruled them out, as they were using their accounts for legitimate
purposes. Our interviews revealed that this was accomplished through a rather simple,
informal process that was most likely facilitated by high levels of trust that parties in the
Norwegian organizations had with one another, perhaps because of their cultural affinity or
prior social and professional relationships. However, the security response team experienced a
great deal of frustration in their attempts to get through to a non-Norwegian astrophysicist
whose account was used to access the grid at the time of the attack. At that university, the
network operations staff were reluctant to share contact information or question the researcher
about his actions. Even after the UiO response team contacted this researcher and confirmed
that their account had been used to compromise the UiO grid, the security staff at the nonNorwegian university did not acknowledge that their systems had been compromised. Only

3 SSH (Secure Shell) is an encryption application that provides secure access to remote computer systems
4 SSH Keys are used by the SSH application to provide two-factor authentication and increase the security of the
connection
5 A backdoor is an undocumented way to access a system that bypasses normal authentication controls.
6 Netflow is a network protocol used to collect data on IP traffic flows. Netflow data is commonly used to in the
network traffic analysis and security investigations.
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after administrators were given detailed information that proved that the university systems
were exploited, did they participate in the investigation and remediation efforts.

5 Resource Analysis
We discuss institutional, IT and organizational resources that were used during the security
incident, and how these influenced the discovery of the attack, investigation and remediation.
Our analysis proceeded as follows: first, we identified the resources that were utilized during
the incident. Each resource was then evaluated as having a complementary,
noncomplementary, or substitutive effect on the incident discovery, investigation and
remediation processes.

5.1 Complementary Resource

Time Required to Remediate Security Incident

We define a complementary resource consistent with Milgrom, Roberts, Brynolffson, Nevo,
Wade and others (as described in the literature review): if adding a resource to a bundle
lowers the time required to remediate a security incident, it is complementary. To
accommodate the supermodular nature or complementary resources, we must determine if
adding more of a resource would further lessen remediation time. This relationship is shown
graphically in figure 1.

Single Resource

Complementary Resources
Quantity of Resource

Figure 1: Time Effects of Complementary Resources

5.2 Non-compatible Resource
Resources are not necessarily complementary. We extend the notion of non-compatible
resources by classifying these as non-complementary or substitutive in nature.
Non-complementary Resource Some resources have a non-complementary impact on
security incident remediation efforts. While these resources may be critical components in an
overall bundle and have complementary effects elsewhere, they may negatively impact the
time require to remediate a security incident. In order to distinguish from a normal business
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obstacle, we also apply the supermodular property to these non-complementary resources:
adding more of a resource has a non-linear negative impact. The relationship of noncomplementary resources is shown graphically in figure 2.

Figure 2: Time Effects of Non-complementary Resources
For example, some technical data and logs are not relevant to a particular security incident.
While it is critical to have information about an attack, extraneous, non-filtered data increases
the effort required to identify the root cause of an issue.

Time Required to Remediate Security Incident

Substitutive Resource Many resources can be substituted for others. In this case there is no
benefit of having substitute resources in a bundle and they are therefore non-compatible
resources. While one resource may be more suited for a particular task, and therefore be more
effective, the time required for remediation efforts would be exclusive along a curve,
unaffected by any substitutive resources in the bundle. This is shown graphically in figure 3.
An example of this would be both IDA Pro and OllyDbg—software applications (technical
resources) which were commonly used by security response teams when they conducted
binary code analysis of malware. While one software package may be more efficient for a
particular platform or use, there is no additional time benefit using both.

Single Resource
Substitutive Resources

Quantity of Resource

Figure 3: Time Effects of Substitutive Resources
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5.3 Resource Analysis
Our analysis identified fourteen resources that were used by or available to the UiO incident
response team. We classified these resources as institutional, technical, and organizational and
then determined if they had a complementary, non-complementary, or substitutive effect on
the response to the security incident described. Table 1 summarizes the resources and their
impacts on time needed to investigate and remediate the incident.

Resource
Institutional

Non-Compatible
NonComplementary Complementary Substitutive

Industry Group Involvement
Yes
UniNETT Network
Yes
Cooperative
Research
Agreements
Laws Regarding Cybercrime

Yes
Yes

Technical
Security
Reports
and
Notifications
System and Network Logs
Yes
Team Member Skills
Yes
Grid Facilities
Security Lab Facilities
Shared User Database
Organizational
Internal Communication Plans
Organizational Structure
Yes
National and Cultural Similarities Yes
Visual Industry Presence
Yes
Table 1: Summary of Findings

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

5.4 Institutional Resources
Industry Group Involvement (Complementary) Involvement in various industry groups is
can be costly and time consuming. It is often hard to quantify a return on this investment. UiO
and Linköping University were both members of the Forum of Incident Response and
Security Teams (FIRST). Their involvement with FIRST provided security training, and
members of this team initially met at a FIRST annual meeting. Since they already had a
relationship, their involvement in FIRST was critical in reducing the time required to
remediate this incident.
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UniNETT Network (Complementary) UniNett provided network access to Norwegian
schools and universities and its members were notified of outages at other institutions. In this
case, notification prompted a staff member at Linköping University to reach out to UiO and
offer assistance. The UiO CERT team would not have actively reached out to other
organizations for help, as they were capable of handling the incident themselves. However,
the additional resources allowed them to focus on root cause analysis while staff at Linköping
performed a technical analysis in their lab.
Cooperatives Research Agreements (Non-complementary) A partnership or cooperative
agreement that allows researchers at different universities to share computational resources is
normally a complementary resource, since organizations share maintenance expenses and
costly hardware and software licenses. In this case, the number of partnerships increased the
complexity of the investigation and was the source of the attack. Thus, these agreements had a
non-complementary effect on the university’s security posture; without this relationship the
time to remediate the incident would have been zero. It therefore had a non-complementary
effect to the remediation efforts.
Laws Regarding Cybercrime (Substitutive) Laws provide a framework for reporting
cybercrimes and punishing violators. These laws have the positive externality of producing
experts in cybercrime investigation. In the case described here, the attacker was never
identified and law enforcement was not notified. Resources that would have been provided to
the investigation team were substituted by the team’s expertise and knowledge of security. An
organization without such resources could utilize law enforcers’ expertise.

5.5 Technical Resources
Security Reports and Notifications (Non-complementary) UiO Operations were notified of
potential security risks, which could potentially have been complementary to the incident
response efforts. When notification was received, the operations team forwarded it to the
CERT team, expecting that the CERT team would take appropriate action. However, the
CERT team believed that since Operations forwarded the notice, they were handling the issue.
Since the notifications were not compatible with the existing process, they had no effect on
prevention efforts and added to the complexity of the root cause and remediation efforts.
Relevant System and Network Logs (Complementary) Netflow and system logs provided
critical information that helped investigators determine the attack vector used by the attacker
and to perform a root cause analysis. Relevant data is a critical component that lessens the
time required for remediation and therefore has a complementary effect.
Team Member Skills (Complementary) The UiO CERT and operations teams and staff at
Linköping University were highly skilled in different technical areas. The operations team
was able to focus on restoring the grid facilities. The CERT team focused their attention on
investigating the system logs and contacting other universities. Linköping staff focused on a
technical examination of the malware through disassembly efforts and observation of the
malware in an isolated security lab (sandbox). These skills were all complementary to the
remediation efforts.
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Grid Facilities (Substitutive) Once the grid was restored, its computational power could
have been used to perform analysis of the malware. Alternatively, some systems could have
been used to create a sandbox for analysis. However, this was not necessary as Linköping
University already had a security lab setup. Since the grid facility was not used, it had a
substitutive effect with Linköping University’s security lab facilities.
Security Lab Facilities (Substitutive) Linköping University had a security sandbox that was
used to analyze the recompiled SSH program and to examine the logging behavior of the
modified SSH application in a safe environment. Investigators also used the lab to identify a
backdoor which would have allowed the attacker to regain access even if passwords were
changed. This was a highly powerful asset, but having more of them would not provide an
increased effect and the analysis could have been done on the disk images (although, the
interviews indicate that would not have been nearly as effective).
Shared User Database (Non-complementary) As part of the cooperative research
agreement, the user database used to access UiO’s grid facilities was shared between various
organizations. This is necessary for remote users to login and use resources on remote
systems. While there may be other technical solutions to share user account data, those would
be substitutes when examined in the context of the research agreement. The sharing of the
user database had a non-complementary effect on the remediation efforts, for it increased the
number of user accounts that were potentially used by the attacker that needed to be
investigated; therefore, the shared databases had a non-complementary effect in this context.

5.6 Organizational Resources
Internal Communication Plans (Non-complementary) The security communication plan
between CERT and Operations was non-complementary. The CERT and operations team did
not effectively communicate security risks and remediation efforts. Operations forwarded the
notification of the vulnerability to the CERT team and expected CERT to take responsibility
for remediation and risk analysis. The CERT team interpreted the forwarded message as an
acknowledgement that the issue was being addressed. Lack of a formal communication plan
had a non-complementary effect as roles and responsibilities had to be defined during the
remediation efforts.
Organizational Structure (Complementary) While the UiO operations team could have
handled the security incident on their own, they had a dedicated emergency response team,
which allowed the CERT team to focus on the investigation and root cause analysis while the
operations team focused on remediation. The security expertise of the CERT team provided
greater depth and efficiency in the investigation. This expertise and predefined division of
responsibilities reduced the time it would have otherwise taken Operations to remediate.
National/cultural similarities (Complementary and Non-complementary) Having cultural
similarities is a valuable resource. The relationship and reputation UiO had with other
Norwegian schools was complementary. Cultural similarities were not present in the nonNorwegian university which may have hindered some remediation efforts and had a noncomplementary effect.
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Visual Industry Presence (Complementary) The lead investigator from Linköping had
previously given technical presentations about investigating security incidents and issues
involved in securing grid systems. He thus built a reputation as an expert and someone that
could be trusted. When he reached out to the CERT team at UiO and offered assistance, they
readily accepted his help. Thus, time to remediation was positively impacted by this
association.

6 Discussion and Suggestions for Further Research
We examined how various resources effected the time required to remediate a network
security incident. We identified aspects of a complementary resource paradox: some resources
have beneficial or complementary aspects with functional requirements of the IT
infrastructure, yet are non-compatible with remediation activities in a security program. We
also find that resources that are complementary at one time may not be compatible with
resource bundles later on. Our research furthers the understanding of non-compatibility by
highlighting the substitutive and non-complementary effects that resources may have when
they are bundled.
A limitation of this study is that we focused on time-to-remediation as a dependent variable,
whereas a more complete study would include various measures of remediation quality and
cost as additional dependent variables.
This is a unique case, with multiple participating organizations. Security resources can
support incident prevention, detection, or correction. By assembling different complementary
security resources a firm will secure their data and intellectual property. Further research is
needed to examine how firms can best collaborate for mutual protection, using
complementary assets and capabilities. Further research is needed to gain insights on whether
and how resources that help prevent security incidents have a substitutive or
noncomplementary impact on incident the detection or on corrective responses.
Our research helps organizations conceptualize how complements, substitutes, and noncomplements may affect their security programs. Examining the interaction effects of
resources from multiple perspectives may help firms better tackle the security versus usability
trade off. In addition, our study reveals that it is helpful to examine the impact of noncompatible resources in one context, weighed against the impact in other contexts. This
deeper understanding of assets and capabilities will allow firms to better manage the
complexity of the environment, which they identified as the biggest threat to IS security. This
increased understanding, from both a functional and security standpoint has the potential to
reduce the impact of security incidents that nevertheless will continue to occur.
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